The Catholic Church has steadfastly resisted efforts by labor relations boards to protect the statutory rights of parochial school 1 teachers who have attempted to organize and bargain collectively.' Church leaders have alleged that labor board jurisdiction violates the First Amendment religion clauses by interfering with the educational mission of inculcating Catholic faith and values. Courts have either accepted this argument and excepted sectarian schools from labor relations acts 4 or dismissed this claim and permitted unrestricted regulationB These contradictory approaches illustrate the complexity of a constitutional question which has bedeviled labor boards, judges, and scholars 6 since 1973.
religious" schools such as seminaries and instead regulated only those "religiously associated." 1 1 This standard engaged the NLRB in making constitutionally problematic judgments about internal Church affairs." 2 Nevertheless, between 1973 and 1977 courts permitted Board jurisdiction. For example, the Second Circuit assumed that such regulation was proper. 13 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Grutka v. Barbour 4 lifted a lower court order enjoining the NLRB from processing unfair labor practice charges against the Diocese of Gary, Indiana, and ruled that the usual NLRA review procedure adequately protected the Church's constitutional rights. 5 While not necessarily endorsing the Board's actions, Grutka rejected the argument that NLRB oversight automatically breaches the First Amendment."
Other judges displayed more sympathy to Church concerns. In Caulfield v. Hirsch, a federal district court prohibited the Board from taking jurisdiction over Philadelphia Catholic elementary schools. 18 Repudiating Grutka as "incorrectly decided," the Caulfield court reasoned that the Church sought not mere judicial review of an administrative order, but jurisdictional standards, which the Board has discretion to set. During the period when the NLRB was asserting jurisdiction over parochial schools, the threshold was $1 million in revenues and $50,000 in out-of-state purchases. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977) . 14. 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) .
15.
Id. at 7-10. The NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982) , requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 7. The court rejected as premature the Church's request for an injunction before any factual record had been developed. Id. at 8-9. The Caulfield court also accepted the Church's dubious contention that a lay faculty unit would disrupt the "single undivided community of faith" composed of religious and lay teachers. 95 L.R.R.M. at 3176. But see Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 646-47 (Philadelphia Archdiocese had voluntarily negotiated with separate lay teacher union for nine years prior to Caulfield without any discord). Bargaining with lay teachers should be no more detrimental to faculty unity than the traditional Church practice of negotiating employment terms and conditions (e.g., stipend, benefits, and housing) with agents from national religious orders that supply teachers. See J. The landmark case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop' 0 stemmed from the refusal of the Chicago Archdiocese to recognize a Board-certified high school lay teachers' union. The Seventh Circuit attacked the NLRB's "completely religious/religiously associated" jurisdictional inquiry as an abuse of discretion which imposed a government determination of a school's spiritual nature on Church authorities." Rejecting the possibility of accommodation, the court held that the Board had violated the religion clauses by becoming "entangled" in religious affairs and by forcing the Bishop to share with unions his canonical decision-making authority."
The Supreme Court affirmed on statutory grounds alone." 3 Chief Justice Burger deemed First Amendment conflicts inescapable because NLRB regulation would impair the Bishop's control over teachers, who played a key role in the schools' religious mission.' 4 The Court assumed that the Board would define "mandatory" subjects of collective bargaining to encompass management issues such as curriculum, thus forcing the Church to negotiate religious policy,' 5 and that NLRB investigators would question the clergy's doctrinal judgments.' 6 The Chief Justice avoided these potential constitutional problems by requiring "the affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed" to include church schools 19 . Caulfield, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3167-68. 20. 440 U.S. 490 (1979) . For discussion of Catholic Bishop, see Recent Cases, 84 Dicm. L. REv Justice Brennan led four dissenters in assailing the majority for "inventing" a canon of statutory construction to "amend" the NLRA, 3 0 and argued that the Act's text (extending to "all employers" except eight specified categories) and legislative history (Congress rejected an amendment to exempt religious employers) revealed an intent to protect parochial school teachers."' He also noted that an exception created solely for church schools generated an establishment clause question. He dismissed the argument that SLRB jurisdiction would compel the Church to bargain over management topics implicating religious policy, 37 noting that from 1969 to 1980 the Archdiocese and the faculty union had confined negotiations to secular employment terms. 38 Furthermore, this case concerned the fir.t unfair labor proceeding in fourteen years, 9 indicating a history of cooperation.
In light of these facts, the Second Circuit disposed of the Church's two 27. Id. at 500-01.
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. Id. at 504-07. religion clause defenses. The court first decided that the Board's role-limited to ordering the diocese to bargain over secular subjects 40 and to processing unfair labor practice charges that required no investigation of religious doctrine4-involved minimal supervision, not the "excessive entanglement" necessary for an establishment clause violation. 42 The court then held that the compelling state interest in enforcing labor laws justified any incidental burdens on the clergy's free exercise rights.' 3 Judge Cardamone's focus on the factual history of parochial school labor relations and his attempt to reconcile competing interests departed from prior judicial approaches, which had accepted the Church's hypothetical arguments and therefore rejected the feasibility of accommodation. This Note adopts Catholic High School's general methodology and conclusions, but corrects two flaws in its First Amendment analysis. First, the Second Circuit confused the central issue-free exercise "burden" on Church autonomy in operating its schools-with establishment clause "entanglement." ' 4 Reliance on the latter is misplaced because uniform application of labor acts to all private schools does not "establish" (i.e., publicly support) religion.' 5 Second, the court oversimplified the free exercise problem by deeming the degree of infringement slight because compliance with labor acts did not contravene Catholic doctrine, which champions workers' rights. 54. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 504, 507 (1979). In resolving this issue, the Court should follow established principles of federalism by deferring to a state labor board, unless the Church provides concrete evidence of a free exercise injury. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (reversing federal court injunction of state commission's investigation of sex discrimination claim filed by discharged sectarian school teacher, provided that church had opportunity to litigate First Amendment claims during and after proceedings).
29.
Decisions affecting Catholic schools also have important practical ramifications, since the Church runs America's largest private educational system, as described supra note 1. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773, 795 (1973) (denying state aid might exacerbate financial plight of parochial schools, thereby causing crisis in public education).
II. THE RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOL LABOR RELATIONS
The judicial rift begun by Catholic High School underscores the need for a fresh approach which nonetheless comports with the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. When individuals or institutions demand exemption from regulation on religious grounds, the Court's threshold task is to determine whether their allegations have a realistic foundation in a church's doctrine and customs -an inquiry designed to detect feigned" or speculative claims. 57 Where a petitioner establishes that application of a law "burdens" a sincere" belief vital to his religion, the state must prove that the regulation serves a "compelling" interest." For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 60 the Court examined the theology and history of the Amish Church, concluding that enforcement of a compulsory school attendance statute would violate the "central," "fundamental" Amish belief that secular education past eighth grade contaminates children 6 l and would threaten the intensely religious, agrarian Amish lifestyle.
6 2 Yoder remains the only case where the Court has found free exercise hardship to be so extreme as to compel invalidation of a general 62. An exemption was granted only because the claimant "convincingly demonstrated," by reference to "a history of three centuries," the sincerity of his religious belief and the hazards of state enforcement to the survival of the Amish faith; the Court emphasized that "few other religious groups" could make such a showing. 
1970) (enforcing Act against Seventh Day Adventist employer whose religion condemns unions).
Compulsory board jurisdiction will, however, infringe Church freedom to pursue a labor policy according to its interpretation of Catholic labor doctrine. See supra note 46. regulatory law; three other claimants have prevailed in the specific context of unemployment compensation statutes applied to deny them benefits because they followed their beliefs." Using a modified Yoder methodology," this Note analyzes relevant Catholic doctrine and the history of lay teachers' unions to evaluate the allegations of some Church leaders that labor board jurisdiction will undermine ecclesiastical authority over education." 5 While perhaps sincerely advanced, such claims are unsupported by empirical data. Indeed, the existing pattern in many dioceses-combining collective bargaining over compensation with Church autonomy over religious issues-should continue as long as labor boards confine their inquiry to secular matters.
A. Catholic Labor and Education Doctrines and the Development of Parochial School Teachers' Unions
Historically, the Catholic Church in the United States adapted the Vatican's pro-labor ideology 6 to achieve practical ends, helping Catholic immigrants find protection in labor organizations." In the twentieth century, social changes wrought by world wars and depression brought redoubled Catholic efforts to ameliorate the plight of workers." American Catholics also continued the Church's traditional educational mission."' An independent school system flourished, serving the large immigrant community at low cost. 70 Schools were staffed by nuns and priests vowed to poverty and obedience-ensuring an inexpensive and compliant labor supply. 64. A strict Yoder approach-investigating church doctrine and history to distinguish core from peripheral religious values-presents a grave danger: substituting judicial determination of the "centrality" of a belief for the judgment of church authorities. This Note suggests that courts conduct a doctrinal/historical inquiry only to provide a background against which to evaluate Church claims on a case-by-case basis. In the parochial school context, judges must focus not on determining the centrality of religious education to Catholicism, but rather on evaluating evidence concerning the effect of labor laws on the educational mission. [Vol. 97: 135 religious education, 2 stressing social justice, 3 and encouraging popular participation 74 -and the subsequent dramatic decrease in religious vocations 7 " transformed American Catholic education. As lay people replaced nuns as the principal source of teachers, 6 questions arose concerning the Church's commitment to applying its labor doctrine to its own workers. Simultaneously, rising public school teacher militancy restructured secular education." Labor acts were applied to teachers, 8 who gained an unprecedented share of participation in management decisions." 9 The combination of burgeoning Catholic school lay faculties and successful public educational unions catalyzed formation of parochial school teacher associations. 8 " The Catholic hierarchy's reaction to unionization ranged from encouragement to grudging acceptance to rejection." Some Church leaders justified disregarding Catholic pro-labor doctrine as necessary to preserve both episcopal authority and the financial health of Cath- as requiring "good faith bargaining" over "mandatory" subjects such as salaries, benefits, and working conditions, but not over "permissive" management issues).
80. However, lay teachers adopted a unique bargaining model that reflected the separate evolution of Catholic education. Unions limited negotiations to "bread and butter" issues and deferred to exclusive clerical control over all decisions implicating religious policy. See Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 71-74 (management topics linked to religion are outside scope of "mandatory" bargaining).
81. For example, the Philadelphia Archdiocese has bargained voluntarily with a lay teachers' union since 1969. See Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 646-47; Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 34 n.9. Similarly, Hartford has negotiated eight bargaining agreements with a teachers' association since 1965. 
B. The Results of Parochial School Unionization
The actual process and impact of collective bargaining in parochial schools indicate the possibility of coexistence. Since the mid-1960's, twenty-seven dioceses have negotiated with teachers' associations. 83 Catholic schools in New York and Hawaii" have experienced compulsory labor board regulation. The results of unionization refute the myths that bargaining inevitably causes spiritual and economic chaos and that enforcement of labor acts entails insoluble constitutional difficulties.
Diocesan collective bargaining illustrates the feasibility of separating "mandatory" secular topics (e.g., salaries and benefits) from "permissive" religious issues. 88 In fact, the National Association of Catholic School Teachers, which represents many unions, insists on inclusion in bargaining agreements of broad "management rights" clauses guaranteeing the hierarchy's freedom to operate schools according to Catholic principles and removing all matters of faith from arbitration and the unfair labor practice process. 8 6 Such respect for ecclesiastical prerogatives was displayed by the NLRB during the mid-1970's 87 and has been maintained by state labor boards. 8 This crucial insight has escaped the notice of many judges, who have assumed that the public school model of negotiating policy matters would be applied to church-operated schools. 86. Reilly Interview, supra note 83. See Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 82-83 (NLRB must recognize "managemental prerogative" in which employer's religious interests are protected absolutely).
87. Examination of NLRB and federal cases reveals no Board attempts to force negotiations over management issues enmeshed with religion. See supra Section I.
88. See, e.g., Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.1 (1985) (Archdiocesan agreement limited to secular issues, reserving religious functions to Church control).
89. Lacking any record evidence to support the conclusion that labor boards interfere with religious policy in elementary and secondary church schools, courts have incorporated irrelevant stud-Parochial school labor relations have been generally peaceful. Indeed, in some dioceses unionization has helped to reduce tension by clarifying the respective roles of priests and teachers and by identifying the goals of Catholic education. 9 " Unfair labor practices are uncommon. For example, Catholic High School represented the first litigation arising out of a bargaining relationship that had begun in 1969;91 in Philadelphia, ten years elapsed between the advent of unionism and the first arbitration.' 2 Similarly, unions have rarely used pressure tactics: only a handful of strikes have occurred, and all were quickly settled. 3 Where low salaries and poor working conditions have caused lay faculty unrest, denying labor board jurisdiction will exacerbate, not eliminate, dissatisfaction.
Finally, the Church has never established a correlation between lay teacher collective bargaining and Catholic school fiscal instability.' 4 Multiple factors unrelated to unionization (particularly demographic changes) explain the financial problems that plague parochial schools. 95 more, common sense dictates that teachers understand the economic situation"' and wish to preserve Catholic schools-and their jobs.' 7 Responding to post-Vatican II realities, American bishops in 1986 endorsed a cooperative, financially responsible approach to negotiations." The hierarchy acknowledged past failures in applying Catholic labor teachings to Church institutions 9 ' and pledged to "fully recognize the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively." 100 Although not legally binding, this moral commitment may signal a new era in parochial school employment relations and foreclose challenges to labor laws.' 1 In short, compliance with labor relations acts may require some adjustments, but need not sacrifice the clergy's First Amendment right to control all religious matters in parochial schools. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RE-ANALYSIS
These overlooked doctrinal and historical factors necessitate a constitutional reevaluation of prior decisions. Courts have weakened their First Amendment analyses by applying establishment clause rules prohibiting "entanglement"' 0 3 -relevant when state agencies implement statutes designed to aid religion-to parochial school labor relations cases, which more properly turn on the free exercise issue of government "burdens" on religion resulting from enforcement of impartial regulatory laws10 4 note 83, at 5-6 (lay teachers average $7000 more in annual compensation than their religious counterparts). Nevertheless, these costs have arisen independent of union influence. See supra note 83 (98% of Catholic teachers not unionized). Moreover, represented high school faculty earn S21,164 in salary and benefits-only 10% more than non-organized teachers. See HIGH SCHOOLS, supra note 83, at 8. 102. See Note, Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 283 (continued operation of Catholic schools with organized faculties indicates that unions do not destroy schools' religious purposes); Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 50 n.68 (same).
103. To survive establishment clause scrutiny, a law must have a secular purpose, must not have the "primary effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion, and must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
104. Where free exercise rights are at stake, the Court shows less concern for establishment problems than in cases involving state aid to religion. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting exception where religious beliefs conflict with regulation) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (invalidating state salary supplements to church school teachers). Nonetheless, expansion of the establishment clause to include action that "inhibits" religion has created confusion. See Furthermore, in evaluating free exercise claims, judges have mechanically applied the Sherbert v. Verner' 0 5 paradigm (i.e., an individual denied statutory benefits for obeying her religious convictions) without questioning its relevance to Catholic school labor disputes," 0 6 which involve different parties and issues. First, an institutional rather than individual claim is asserted: the Church's right to operate schools free from state interference.
1 0 7 Second, unlike the unemployment compensation scheme voided in Sherbert, labor relations acts do not withhold government largesse from Catholic employers for adhering to their beliefs. 10 8 On the contrary, the Church is requesting the special benefit of exemption from neutral labor laws; in analogous situations, the Court has refused to grant such privileges. 1 0 ' Moreover, Sherbert's three part test-considering whether claims are religious or secular, whether state action "burdens" free exercise, and whether the government has a sufficiently "compelling The "entanglement" in the "parochaid" cases involved ongoing government surveillance of teachers to ensure state funds were not being used for sectarian purposes. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975). Such intrusive monitoring is a far cry from the minimal interference caused
by labor board jurisdiction. See Warner, supra note 6, at 478-91; Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 46-47, 61-62. Moreover, statutes granting money to church schools are distinguishable from purely regulatory laws, even though statutory "neutrality" remains an elusive concept. See, e.g., Lemon at 613 (in subsidizing parochial schools, legislature pursued secular aim of enhancing quality of education). 108. See supra note 63 (cases striking down unemployment compensation statutes). Sherbert recognized that a statute imposing an "indirect" financial burden, forcing one to forego religious practices (e.g., Sabbath observance) to obtain benefits, offends free exercise as much as a law that directly compels or prohibits religious conduct. 374 U.S. at 403-04. Sherbert does not imply, however, that any regulation which increases a church's costs is an unconstitutional "indirect burden." See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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109.
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting Amish religious objector's request for exemption from paying social security taxes); id. at 261-64 (Stevens, J., concurring) (while state must show compelling interest to justify "unequal treatment" of religious observers, burden of proof shifts to claimant who demands exemption from neutral, generally-applicable law). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding IRS denial of tax-exempt status to religious college which sought exception from antidiscrimination laws on ground that their religion mandated certain forms of racial discrimination).
interest" 1 1 -has been inconsistently applied, reflecting the Court's desire to weigh more heavily legislative concerns.""'
Balancing the Church's wish to prevent labor board intrusion against the state's interest in protecting employees' rights, this Note uses a flexible free exercise analysis which devises limiting principles that tailor board jurisdiction to accommodate First Amendment concerns,,"
A. Regulation of Parochial Schools and Their Teachers: The Church's General Claims
The Church's argument that religious affiliation relieves a school employer of the duty to obey labor acts equates any government contact with unconstitutional interference and ignores already-pervasive regulation. 1 " Except for wholly spiritual practices like worship, freedom to act in exercise of beliefs is not absolute.' 14 Important but not purely religious areas like education may be regulated in their secular aspects. 1 5 For example, under its police power, the government enforces fire, building, and zoning ordinances. 1 16 Pursuant to educational codes, states accredit and inspect all schools, certify teachers, and implement attendance, calendar, and curriculum requirements' 17 -thereby imposing government educational preferences on church schools and directly influencing the process of transmit- (1986) (plurality opinion) (statute requiring provision of social security number to receive welfare benefits upheld as serving "legitimate public interest" even though it "indirectly and incidentally" forced choice between adhering to beliefs or obtaining benefits) with Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1048-50 (1987) (criticizing Roy and reaffirming "compelling state interest" scrutiny).
112. Cf Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 662 (rejecting "tailoring" as too costly). 113. Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 48 n.58 (parochial schools subject to significant degree of state regulation which presupposes severance of religious from secular conduct). Such comprehensive supervision vitiates Laycock's argument that clergy might oppose labor board jurisdiction to avoid a precedent which could be used to justify regulation in other areas. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1398-99.
114. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
See Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord:
A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COi.UM. L. REv. 1514, 1539-49 (1979) (placing church schools midway between core spiritual practices (e.g., worship) which are immune from government regulation and purely secular enterprises (e.g., businesses) where regulation is acceptable).
Especially where the Church supplants a state institution, the government may implement uniform standards. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-48 (1968) (schools used to fulfill compulsory education laws may be required to meet state-imposed instructional criteria). ," 19 Title VII,   120 and payroll tax and deduction laws""-thus increasing operating costs. Since the Catholic Church accepts this comprehensive regulation, labor board jurisdiction should be similarly unobjectionable. 12 The foregoing analysis reveals the myopia of Catholic Bishop's exclusive focus on a teacher's "unique role . . . in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school. 12 3 Existing government regulation implicitly acknowledges two other roles: as a substitute for a public school instructor and as an employee, a parochial school teacher is subject to ordinary educational and employment laws. Therefore, unless labor relations acts are peculiarly burdensome, they likewise should be enforced.
B. Labor Relations Acts and Free Exercise Interference
Labor acts, which expressly limit labor board jurisdiction and remedial power, 24 seem less intrusive than other regulations imposed on schools. Boards intervene only at the request of employees who decide to exercise their right to organize and bargain collectively. 2 5 Moreover, labor laws preserve managerial control over personnel and policy matters and prohibit only anti-union activities." 6 Nevertheless, the potential for free exercise interference arises in applying particular statutory provisions-problems best foreclosed by restricting labor board discretion. [Vol. 97: 135
Labor Board Assertion of Jurisdiction
Some Church leaders have opposed the threshold assertion of board jurisdiction 1 7 as curbing their freedom to supervise religious education. 2 8 They raise two significant concerns. First, labor boards must avoid judgments regarding the relative religiousness of a school 12 '-an inquiry which led the NLRB to conclude that Catholic schools are not "religious institutions." 13 0 Instead, boards must adhere to neutral monetary yardsticks (e.g., revenue) in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction."' Second, boards must sacrifice their usual discretion to designate an appropriate bargaining unit. 132 The NLRB often certified a multi-elementary school unit to maximize teacher bargaining clout, ignoring the fact that the Church entrusts control over each elementary school to the local pastor2 3 3
-in contrast to diocesan high schools under centralized episcopal administration.lu Labor boards must accept clerical decisions regarding the autonomy or interdependence of Catholic schools in each diocese and select bargaining units accordingly.
13 5 With these restrictions, the mere assertion of jurisdiction over-parochial school labor relations poses little threat to free exercise. 
1977). The
Church also argues that board jurisdiction will "chill" its exercise of religious rights. 559 F.2d at 1124; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3177-78; Bastress, supra note 6, at 328-29; Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 660-62. Because all regulation affects religious conduct somewhat, the potential for "chilling" alone is an insufficient reason to strike a statute. See Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1170-71 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissing any "chilling effect" as incidental).
129. See supra notes 11-12, 21. This Note urges abandonment of the NLRB's "completely religious/religiously associated" test. But see Warner, supra note 6, at 501 (defending Board standard as avoiding entanglement); Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 41-42, 46-49 (same).
130. Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R. B. 1218, 1218 (1976) . See also Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502 (NLRB questioning clergy about school's religious activities infringes free exercise).
131. See supra note 10. Labor boards might shift their focus from the religious employer, considering instead whether an employee of a religious organization was hired from the public marketplace and whether he has a secular counterpart. Comment, A New Approach to NLRB Jurisdiction over the Employment Practices of Religious Institutions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 243 (1987) . Applied to parochial schools, this analysis would exclude from jurisdiction religion teachers but not math faculty. Id.
at 273. This "employee activity" test, however, would embroil labor boards in classroom investigations-for example, whether a biology teacher addressing sexuality from a Catholic perspective has a secular counterpart. Furthermore, since the Church retains discretion to discipline a teacher who refuses to implement a religion program as ordered by Catholic authorities, distinctions among lay teachers are unnecessary, and also would fragment the union.
132 
Processing Unfair Labor Practice Charges
The possibility of unconstitutional infringement increases when unfair labor practice charges are filed: in ensuing adversarial procedures, a labor board's judgments may tread on religious freedoms . 36 Nevertheless, boards can minimize interference by adapting their ordinary principles of restraint and by formalizing extant Catholic school bargaining customs.
The Church contends that its refusal to discuss employment terms affecting religious policy will incur board sanctions for violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, 8 7 based on the assumption that such matters are mandatory items of negotiation.' 3 8 However, doctrinal subjects are within the permissive "management rights" area. The alleged impossibility of separating secular from religious bargaining issues' 3 9 is belied by dozens of diocesan collective agreements that accomplish precisely this goal.' 4 0 Labor boards can avoid conflict by maintaining this dichotomy and by following their usual practice of not interfering with negotiations over specific contract terms.1 4 '
Churches also fear that boards will assess the doctrinal validity of asserted religious defenses in "mixed motive" discharge cases. 42 For example, the Catholic Bishop court posed the hypothetical of a school dismissing a pro-union teacher who also advocated a position "totally at odds with . . .[the] Catholic faith," 14 such as favoring abortion. A discriminatory discharge complaint in this situation could be resolved using estab- 140. See supra notes 85-88. Blurred areas of the "secular vs. religious" bargaining dichotomy might appear. For example, the "secular" issue of salaries could implicate financial stability, infringing the Church's basic free exercise right to operate schools. But see supra note 94 (statistics reveal no correlation between collective bargaining and budget difficulties). Even assuming the bishops could demonstrate that enforced bargaining had such an effect, this would simply indicate the hierarchy's failure to raise adequate funds. Constitutionally, it is less problematic for the government to insist that churches recover the expenses of running schools (including costs of compliance with regulations) from religious adherents than to exempt religious employers from laws. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing this indirect "establishment"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated Church predictions of financial doom as legally irrelevant in the "parochaid" cases. Supreme Court held that the NLRB must limit its inquiry to instances where "but for" anti-union animus, the employer would not have fired a worker. Applying this standard to parochial schools, Church proof of a doctrinal reason for discharge (e.g., pro-abortion teaching) would make any contributing anti-union motivation irrelevant and would foreclose inquiry into religious beliefs (e.g., Catholic pro-life theology).
1 45
In sum, labor boards may regulate parochial schools by observing these constitutionally mandated limits: employing neutral jurisdictional standards, enforcing the duty to bargain over secular issues only, and prosecuting unmistakable unfair labor practices. Such modified application of labor acts reduces the Church's religious claim to an alleged right to avoid the inconvenience and expense of compliance-incidental hardships not triggering "compelling state interest" scrutiny. 1 46 The government's interest in uniform enforcement of labor laws 1 47 outweighs minor, primarily economic burdens on religious organizations. 
C. Restricted Labor Board Jurisdiction: The Optimal Accommodation
Certainly, the proffered restrictions on labor board conduct somewhat reduce the effectiveness of labor acts, amounting to a partial exemption for parochial school employers. Nevertheless, such sensitivity is necessary to protect free exercise religious liberty. 1 49 This Note's proposal represents the optimal accommodation: it preserves employees' statutory rights, while preventing government intrusion into religious affairs. In contrast, the Catholic Bishop construction of the NLRA crafted a blanket exception 50 that destroyed these legislative guarantees without serving any additional purpose except to save Church employers the cost of obeying labor laws. This indirect aid, not "excessive entanglement," is the key establishment clause issue raised by parochial school labor relations cases. 1 "' Because all attempts to accommodate free exercise in a sense "advance" religion, 15 2 a partial rather than total exemption is always preferable" 8 3 when religious rights can be safeguarded through the less drastic alternative. 1 5 4
Labor board exercise of jurisdiction with due respect for the religious prerogatives of Catholic school employers 5 5 obviates the need for judicial intervention. Unlike legislatures, which may exceed the requirements of free exercise in accommodating religion, courts lack the power to carve exceptions into statutes promoting the general welfare 56 unless the free 151. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 518 n.11 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (audidally created exception solely for church schools raises establishment clause question). See also Warner, supra note 6, at 482-84 (non-assertion of jurisdiction is a "special privilege" forbidden by establishment clause). I (1982)) ). Justice White assumed the constitutional adequacy of Title VII's original exemption covering employees fulfilling a religious function (the type of accommodation this Note favors). Id. at 2868. Nonetheless, the Court noted that a tribunal's failure to perceive the religious significance of seemingly "secular" activities might interfere with a church's ability to carry out its religious mission. Therefore, the Court concluded, this amendment constituted "benevolent neutrality" permitted by the establishment clause and was a legislative decision "entitled to deference." Id. at 2867-70.
This admittedly broad exemption may nevertheless be deemed "partial" in the sense that Title VII's other anti-discrimination provisions apply to religious employers. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), discussed supra note 109; EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), described supra note 120. Thus, Amos merely allows parochial schools to discriminate against personnel for religious reasons-a privilege this Note supports. Cf. supra note 145 (Catholic school may fire teacher who flouts Catholic beliefs).
155. Some states have determined that exclusion of church institutions from labor acts is unnecessary. See infra note 156. Presumably, though, legislatures intend that labor boards apply statutory provisions sensitive to the religious concerns of sectarian employers. Whether implicit or explicit, such lawmaking efforts to facilitate free exercise do not violate the establishment clause. See id.
156. For example, Amos involved Congressional efforts to protect free exercise: A court must uphold such a legislative accommodation-even one that exceeds that required by free exerise-unless it violates the establishment clause by aiding or sponsoring religion. 107 S. Ct. at 2867-70. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (courts must "define the proper Establishment Clause limits" on legislative accommodations to prevent government "endorsement" of religion). In contrast, New York's legislature denied a special exemption for religious employers in its labor relations act. See supra notes 150 & 155. Thus, the statute cannot raise an establishment clause problem. Instead, the sole judicial inquiry is whether application of the act violates the free exercise rights of a church employer in a particular case. See generally McConnell, supra note 152, at 30-31 (legislative accommodation requires only prima fade free exercise claim, whereas judicial exemptions must be "confined to the most serious burdens"). See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (because Sherbert v. Verner, exercise clause compels this extreme step to remedy a significant infringement of religious rights. 157 Therefore, the Supreme Court has no authority to invalidate a state labor relations act absent evidence of a specific constitutional violation. 1 58
IV. CONCLUSION
Labor board regulation of parochial schools poses unique legal problems, yet illustrates the more general struggle to reconcile statutory requirements with the First Amendment. Courts best protect free exercise values by recognizing only documented claims of burdens on religious beliefs and practices and by accommodating religious activity only to the extent necessary to secure constitutional rights. Blind acceptance of all asserted "religious" objections to enforcement of important government policies frustrates rather than serves the objectives of the religion clauses.
